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Abstract
From both jus ad bellum and jus in bello perspectives, the lawfulness of unmanned
aerial vehicle/combat drone strikes have been examined extensively but not yet
exhaustively. Recent advances in technology allow combat drones to operate as a
swarm—similar to their vespidae counterparts. An overly simplistic conclusion
would suggest that the current legal tapestry applicable to solo drone usage would
‘automatically’ apply to drones acting collectively or as a swarm. This article, how-
ever, posits a more controversial position that the technological uniqueness of indi-
vidual drones acting as a swarm necessitates a more thorough deconstruction of the
applicable legal framework. In other words, does the unique way in which a swarm
operates lawfully comply with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello parameters?
Crucial to this discussion, is to examine the extent to which a swarm is programmed
both offensively and defensively—with a view to exploring the algorithm of an
automated response from other drones within the swarm. Within this broader ques-
tion, the article seeks to scrutinise two specific areas. First, to what extent is the
drone swarm’s architecture calibrated to comply with the cardinal self-defence par-
ameters of necessity and proportionality should the swarm be attacked? And sec-
ondly, is the ‘swarm’ capable of being fully jus in bellow compliant in terms of
distinction and proportionality and the duty to take precautions (‘The General
Principles’). Would, for example, the chain of command structure in a drone
swarm encompass the concept of the ‘reasonable military commander’ when it
comes to targeting? The purpose of this article is not to reopen, or indeed close
the debate surrounding artificial intelligence and its ethical implications. Rather, it is
to seek to open further discussion surrounding the applicability of 20th century legal
thresholds to 21st century phenomena and beyond.
1. Introduction
A common misconception—albeit one which, does not permeate into scholarly
literature, is that single drone usage is an entirely late 20th century phenomenon.
This is simply not the case.1 Similarly, while the ‘swarming’ of drones is
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undeniably a recent and unique phenomenon (hence the purpose of this article)
‘swarming’ as a battlefield strategy has been utilised previously.2 What military
structure or hierarchy would want to allow the swarm complete autonomy as to
what to attack? With regards to the consensus model, the ‘default’ position is
that military forces are not normally given freedom of manoeuvre—they are
ordered/programmed what to do. This suggests that the Swarm operating under
the consensus model would be no different. However, historical examples dem-
onstrate that certain military operations (predating the swarming of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs)) have utilised swarming with this very approach in mind:
individual elements within the swarm decide what target to engage. Burdick
provides excellent coverage of the historical/strategic application noting that
the German Stosstruppen (stormtroopers) and Japanese kamikazes employed
swarming tactics ‘to provide operational effects by destroying enemy forces and
controlling geographic territory or sea space’. As Burdick elaborates, both ex-
amples only had the capacity to ‘swarm’ at local level unless receiving the green
light from high command.3 Burdick concludes (having surveyed the use of
swarming in both the Battle of Britain and in Operation Desert Storm) that
to conclude that strategic swarming has not been possible in the modern era is
patently incorrect. Rather, he views (at least in relation to Desert Storm) ‘that
US airpower has not been deliberately structured for sustained swarming oper-
ations. Specific examples of tactical swarming may have occurred, yet they were
usually brief, discrete, and/or unintended’.
The lawfulness and legality of single drone strikes from both jus and bellum
and jus in bello angles continue to be afforded comprehensive scrutiny.4
However, the present literature has yet to really consider the lawfulness or
not as to the way in which a swarm operates and thoroughly deconstruct its
compliance with the demands of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
Recent tests and deployment of swarms albeit in a non-conflict context from the
International Law Journal 409–47, 413, noting that the first reported use of a ‘drone’
was in 1919, when a pilotless aircraft sunk a German battleship.
2 J Arquilla and D Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, 2000). The authors observe that swarming an adversary or, engaging an
adversary from all directions simultaneously, either with fire or in force—is one of
four types of doctrine that had been around for a long time. See also JE Burdick,
‘Instantly Basis Locust Swarms: New Options for Future Air Operations’ (Air
University Press, Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2016)
2. Burdick notes that the concept of swarming as a whole is nothing inherently new,
citing the example of ‘multidirectional hit-and-run tactics by irregular swarms of
“shock troops” to exploit gaps and weaknesses in enemy lines of operation during
World War I’.
3 Burdick’s analyses the limitations of the Stosstruppen as follows: ‘ . . . German
Stosstruppen (storm troopers) were often dependent on exterior lines of communica-
tion for resupply, reinforcements, and artillery support’. Regarding the Kamikaze he
notes that ‘. . . the effect of kamikaze forces was limited by aircraft range, their aircraft
carrier’s inventory of fuel and weapons, and the availability of qualified pilots’.
4 See fns 92 and 96 for a further clarification.
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USA, Russian and Chinese Military make this topic open for a timely appraisal.5
To a greater degree, it can be said that there is less decision-making power
vested in the human in a drone swarm operation than in comparison to a lone
drone operation—as the drones in the swarm/formation are attributed with spe-
cific tasks which will be triggered off at individual points of the mission.
However, on the other hand, there is an increased accountability to the actions
of individual drones/robots used in a swarm. It is highly likely that in the very
near future autonomous Global Position System (GPS) guided and drone
swarms will become a mainstay in military affairs,6 leading to various questions
and claims arising from their actions.
One of the crucial remits of the work is to examine the legal consequences of
actions taken in self-defence using an automated weapons system, and how this
translates into a complex drone swarm scenario. The overarching goal of this
article is to deconstruct the way in which a swarm may operate and ascertain its
compliance (or not) within both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks.
Objectors could of course, argue that the legal issues raised here, are not
unique to swarms of UAVs but rather relate to all manner of autonomous
weapons system (AWS) and would go on to posit that if such differences
exist, they derive from the degree of autonomous operation that the UAVs
are capable of in terms of targeting, rather than the fact that multiple UAVs
operate as a group. The authors, however, view that UAVs acting as a swarm is
far more complex (depending on the architecture) than a single autonomous
weapons system—it is at its simplest, a multi-autonomous set-up. While there
already exists a substantial corpus of literature on autonomous weapon systems,
the focus of this article is solely on the legal issues raised by swarms of UAVs.
Again, one might concede that these relate to all manner of autonomous weap-
on systems, however, this article wishes to keep this focus on the specific nature
of swarms. One might argue that UAVs are programmable devices rather than
sentient entities. We are not seeking to reopen the perennial ethical debate
surrounding drones and the nature of control by the drone operator which,
5 KD Atherton, ‘LOCUST Launcher Fires A Swarm of Navy Drones’ (24 May 2016)
5http://www.popsci.com/navys-locust-launcher-fires-swarm-drones4 (accessed 20
September 2016). LOCUST stands for ‘LOw-Cost Unmanned aerial vehicle
Swarming Technology’; —‘Russian 6th-Gen Drone Fighter Jets to Fly in Swarms,
Enter Near Space’ (12 July 2016)5https://www.rt.com/news/350736-russian-fighter-
jets-drone-swarm/4 (accessed 20 September 2016); D Hambling, ‘If Drone Swarms
are the Future, China May be Winning,’ Popular Mechanics (23 December 2016)
5http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a24494/chinese-drones-swarms/
4 (accessed 31 May 2017).
6 P Scharre, ‘Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm’ Center for New
American Security (October 2014) 35, where the author notes that ‘emerging robotic
technologies will allow tomorrow’s forces to fight as a swarm, with greater mass,
coordination, intelligence and speed than today’s networked forces’.
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ultimately concludes that drones are not illegal weapons per se with regards to
targeting because of human override and oversight.
To this end, Section 2 provides an overview of current technology and devel-
opments within the area of drone swarms. Section 3 considers the jus ad bellum
question as to whether or not, and how a drone swarm is able to fully calibrate
its action or response within the necessity and proportionality thresholds. More
specifically, this area of analysis hones in on the scenario of an attack against a
drone belonging to a swarm, and the immediate reaction in self-defence of the
swarm itself. Section 4, meanwhile, will seek to frame the broader question of
whether the unique behaviour of the swarm, particularly in terms of its re-
sponses, is fully IHL compliant. By way of overall conclusion, the authors pos-
ition that the use of drone swarms is not inherently incompatible with jus ad
bellum considerations. Equally, to categorically reject a swarms’ compliance
with IHL, would be patently incorrect. Rather, the article seeks to underscore
that the variable of lawfulness firmly hinges not only on the swarm’s architecture
but also the chain of command.
2. Technological Overview and Current Developments
Combat drones as a single strike platform present the distinct strategic advan-
tage of being ‘unmanned’7 and controlled remotely.8 While a human element
is undeniably present, the level of direct combat participation is far removed if
one compares a UAV/Combat drone strike platform to that of an F-35. Unlike
an F-35 pilot, the drone/UAV operator does not face the risk of being shot
down. Some control, albeit remotely, is still in the hands of human operators.
The undeniable strategic appeal of such a strike platform is a reduction in
the number of possible human fatalities9 that may arise from such ‘air
7 See NJ Cooke and RA Chadwick, ‘Lessons Learned from Human-Robotic
Interactions on the Ground and in the Air’ in M Barnes and F Jentsch (eds),
Human-Robot Interaction in Future Military Operations (Ashgate Publishing Ltd
2010) 355–72, where the authors state the view that the term ‘unmanned’ is a mis-
nomer as UAVs are rife with human factors issues. Although the vehicle itself is
uninhabited there are numerous personnel on the ground (command centre, etc)
engaged in remote operation, sensing, communications, etc, and that the vehicles
are not fully automated but remotely operated with various degrees of automation.
8 GBA Ronconi, TJBatista and V Merola, ‘The Utilization of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) For Military Action in Foreign Airspace’ UFRGSMUN: UFRGS
Model United Nations Journal (2014) 137–82. Combat drones, referred to as UAVs
and as remotely piloted vehicles, are pilotless aerial vehicles which can be guided
either through remote control by a military squad in its home country, or that can
navigate autonomously based on a pre-programmed software.
9 ibid. See M Boot, ‘The Paradox of Military Technology’ The New Atlantis (2006) 13–
31. Precision-Guided Munitions used in drone increases the accuracy of strikes to a
point where it is possible to aim at a single human being and eventually hit it precisely,
resulting in less fatalities.
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strikes’.10 When the numbers of the UAVs11 are multiplied with each drone
attributed a specific task and programmed to act in sync towards a particular
strategic goal, a drone swam is created.12 Here, individual drones are capable
of navigating on their own while sharing information amongst themselves (dy-
namic information) and also to ground control station (GCS).13 The GPS
feeds information to the drones/swarm to ascertain their coordinates and
plan and execute the flight.14 Technologically speaking, drone swarms are
used as force multipliers in the battlefield,15 and are essentially networked
drones.16 Similar to multiple networked computers, drones are similarly net-
worked to create a swarm, and to avoid any mid-air collisions.17 Drone swarms
are capable of ‘collective motion’ a behavioural trait observed in the animal
kingdom. Bees, ants, birds, etc, are all capable of/exhibit collective motion
whilst in flight mode, which is instinctual and well-coordinated.18 This
10 On this point, one could analogise, and refer to Turns’ analysis on his piece on Cyber
Warfare and direct participation in hostilities (DPH) in IHL. D Turns, ‘Cyber
Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2012) 17(2) Journal
of Conflict & Security Law 279–97. The authors are grateful to Professor JA Green
who helpfully raised the idea (when commenting on an earlier draft) that within the
context of international humanitarian law and direct participation in hostilities (in
relation to remotely piloted or fully automated weapons) there cannot be a complete
removal of human participation.
11 For a definition and general discussion of UAVs, their development and applications,
see K Nonami, F Kendoul, S Suzuki, W Wang and D Nakazawa, Autonomous Flying
Robots: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Micro Aerial Vehicles (Springer, 2010). The
authors also note that the main UAV applications are defence related and the invest-
ments are driven by future military scenarios.
12 A Bu¨rkle, F Segor and M Kollmann, ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV Swarms’
(2011) 61(1–4) Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems 339–53. See P Bhalla,
‘Emerging Trends in Unmanned Aerial Systems’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn, 2015)
86–94 5http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1119543205_Emergingtrendsinunm
annedaerialsystems.pdf4 (accessed 20 September 2016).
13 ibid. There is a dedicated channel between individual UAVs and the GCS to transmit
status information from the UAVs and to receive commands from the GCS. There is
also a dedicated data channel between individual UAVs and the GCS to send results
of tasks. Also, a cooperative channel is opened between two UAVs, if one of them
needs assistance to finish a task.
14 Y Qu and Y Zhang, ‘Cooperative Localization Against GPS Signal Loss in Multiple
UAV Flights’ (2011) 22(1) Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics 103–12.
15 Bu¨rkle, Segor and Kollmann (n 12).
16 Bhalla (n 12). The author identifies the swarms as a ‘heterogeneous mix of machines
with dissimilar tasks but contributing synergistically to the overall mission objectives’.
17 K Kim, ‘Integrating Coordinated Path Following Algorithms to Mitigate the Loss of
Communication Among Multiple UAVs’ (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California 2014); JD Foster, ‘Swarming Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs): Extending Marine Aviation Ground Task Force Communications Using
UAVs’ (Master’s thesis Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 2014).
18 This particular feature clearly demonstrates the emergence and the introduction of AI
into the modern day battlespace in recent times.
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particular feature of the drone swarms is highly desirable as it gives a tactical
advantage, when it comes to manoeuvring in rugged terrains and amongst city
scape.
Another quality that is found in a drone swarm is the division of labour, which
is well demonstrated amongst bees, ants, etc.19 For instance, in February 2016,
Sistemprom, a Russian company unveiled a ‘multicopter complex’ which com-
prised a number of drones, with individual capabilities and specific tasks as-
signed to each drone in the formation.20 They are decentralised when
operating alone and when acting collectively, they perform a dynamic task
with the objective of achieving a common goal.21 Operating as a swarm,
teams of less expensive drones can achieve more than a single drone/robot.
This was demonstrated by the US Navy in May 2016 with the launch of its
LOCUST Programme, where smaller, cheaper drones were used, with a single
human controlling them from afar.22 More recent innovations developed by
Advanced Robotic Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL)23 have demon-
strated that a single individual can control 50 drones at a given time, with the
long goal to have the swarms determine how to act on their own, and to even-
tually have a drone swarm dogfight.24 Currently, Arizona State University
(ASU) is researching the possibility of mind-controlled drones/drone swarms,
which would allow a single user to operate multiple drones through thought
(brainwaves).25 According to Panagiotis Artemiadis, director of the Human-
Oriented Robotics and Control Lab at ASU, the future goal is to expand the
research to include multiple swarms under the control of multiple people and
sees the drones ‘performing complex operations, such as search-and-rescue
19 ibid.
20 ___‘Killer Drone Squad: Russia Unveils Anti-Armor Assault Multicoptor’ (10
February 2016) 5https://www.rt.com/news/332045-tank-destroyer-drone-complex/4
(accessed 20 September 2016). The system comprises of four drones, viz, a robotic
helicopter, sentinel multicopter, reconnaissance multicopter and an assault multicop-
ter, with the drones capable of performing asks separately or jointly. JS Bellingham,
M Tillerson, M Alighanbari, and JP How, ‘Cooperative Path Planning for Multiple
UAVs in Dynamic and Uncertain Environments’ (Proceedings of the 41st IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, 2002) 2816–822; A Richards JS Bellingham,
M Tillerson, and JP How, ‘Coordination and Control of Multiple UAVs’ in AIAA
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Monterey, California (2002).
21 ibid.
22 Atherton (n 5).
23 ARSENL, is part of the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. The team
had previously launched 30 drones and controlled them simultaneously in July 2016. R
Bishop, ‘Record-Breaking Drone Swarm Sees 50 UAVs Controlled by a Single
Person’ (16 September 2016)5http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/news/
a17371/record-breaking-drone-swarm/4 (accessed 20 September 2016).
24 ibid.
25 R Alvarez, ‘With This Interface One Person Can Control a Swarm of Drones With
Their Mind’ (18 July 2016)5http://thescienceexplorer.com/technology/interface-one-
person-can-control-swarm-drones-their-mind4 (accessed 20 September 2016).
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missions’.26 The Pentagon for its part has been experimenting with new proto-
types, viz, microdrones that can be launched from the flare dispensers of moving
F-16 s and F/A-18 fighter jets.27 Although specifics of the capabilities of the mini
drones remain classified, it is understood that they could be used to confuse
enemy forces and carry out surveillance missions using equipment that costs
much less than full-sized unmanned aircraft.28
In July 2016, Russia unveiled its sixth-generation drone fighter jets, which it
claimed was largely consisted of unmanned aircrafts and drone swarms allowing
a single-piloted aircraft command for up to 10 unmanned vehicles.29 What is
interesting about the Russian model is the command for the drone swarms
comes from the pilot who is airborne and part of the formation, and as well
as from the GCS, as opposed to only from the GCS. This is a departure from
what has been witnessed in drone operations for over a decade. What we see
here is a semi-autonomous robot, which is capable of performing certain tasks
on its own, but still requiring human input in terms of decision-making, etc. The
GCS plays an important role in supporting any mission for the drones and drone
swarms, whilst also serving as the human interface to the drones and drone
swarms in the air.30
The purpose of this present section is to consider the scientific and techno-
logical background that ‘informs’/programmes a swarm’s behaviour—namely
swarm algorithm architecture; swarming in a network-centric warfare.31 Such
discussions will enable this article to more concretely address the jus ad bellum
and jus in bello parameters and the way in which the swarm does or does not
comply with those frameworks. The authors maintain as highlighted in the ab-
stract, that the legal framework applicable to single-drone usage is not automat-
ically transposed to that of a swarm—therefore, an understanding as to precisely
how the swarm is configured and operates is paramount.
Therefore, the following issues need to be addressed from a technological
perspective. First, is a swarm just one legal actor consisting of various parts,
26 ibid.
27 The experiment was run by the Strategic Capabilities Office, a secretive Pentagon
organization launched in summer 2012 to counter growing strategic threats from
China and Russia. See D Lamothe, ‘Veil of Secrecy Lifted on Pentagon Office
Planning Drone Swarms’ The Washington Post (8 March 2016)5https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/08/inside-the-secretive-pentagon-office-
planning-skyborg-fighters-and-drone-swarms/4 (accessed 20 September 2016).
28 ibid.
29 See fn 5. It is claimed by the developers that the unmanned aircraft, flying at hyper-
sonic speed would be able to interact and transit through space.
30 KP Arnold, ‘The UAV Ground Control Station: Types, Components, Safety,
Redundancy, and Future Applications’ (2016) 4(1) International Journal of
Unmanned Systems Engineering 37–50.
31 See eg J Lenahan, P Charles, R Reed, D Pacetti, and M Nash, ‘Mapping Network
Centric Operational Architectures to C2 and Software Architecture’ Twelfth
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 12th
ICCRTS), 19–21 June 2007, Newport, (2007).
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or does each part possess unique individual legal attributes? If it is the former, is
it legally significant whether one deals with a drone swarm or an individual
drone? If it is the latter, how does one determine which part possess separate
attributes? And how would, in that case, a swarm be distinguished from other
highly complex war machines, such as tanks or submarines that are all composed
of an enormous number of sensors, parts, programs that all contribute to the
versatility of the given machine?
In other words, to what extent could a drone swarm be compared to convoys
of ships or formations of fighter planes—are the issues that a swarm raise in
practice entirely novel? What exactly is the technical state of the art regarding a
drone swarm? Which exact chain of command do the drone algorithms provide
for? How is the degree of autonomy of a drone measured and how are swarms
categorized by the various military powers around the world that use them?
Given the volume of interrogatives posed, Section 2 will be subdivided into
three distinct parts. Section A will address (from a technological perspective)
whether a swarm is a single entity or comprises differing individual compo-
nents—is the swarm simply to be treated as highly complex strike platform?
Section B will then examine whether a swarm’s behavioural pattern is simply
analogous to that of a fighter squadron’s tactical formation or whether there is
something inherently unique about the way in which it operates—the view main-
tained by the current authors. Section C will inform the IHL discussion in
Sections 3 and 4 of this article by considering the exact chain of command
(C2) that the algorithms provide. Even if one were to concede that presently
the swarm itself is analogous to that of a fighter squadron it is relatively uncon-
troversial to assert that this conclusion will soon be outdated.
A. Models of Swarm Architecture
Although swarming as a tactical/strategic military option has been in operation
for centuries, it was not until recently that it had been explored as a serious
option for application in modern warfare. Arquilla and Ronfeldt define swarm-
ing as ‘a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all
directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well
as from stand-off positions’.32 This working definition of swarming presents a
formula that could be adopted to warfare in all domains—land, water, air, space
and possibly in cyberspace.33
Do drones within the swarm act individually or as a collective unit? This is
very much dependent on how the Swarm is configured. Therefore, it is overly
simplistic to conclude that it is either entirely individual or entirely collective. In
32 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (n 2). The authors also note that in modern warfare swarming
will only work if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dis-
persed, networked manoeuvre units—referred to as ‘pods’ organized in ‘clusters’.
33 The model propounded by Arquilla and Ronfeldt was primarily designed for ‘netwar’
and cyberwar.
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order to capture and comprehend swarm architecture, it is necessary to explore
some of the models that have been used in network-centric warfare over the
decades. Just prior to this exploration, it is worth providing a brief overview
along the following lines. Swarms invariably need a human commander at the
mission level, giving overarching guidance, but delegated with a wide range of
tasks to be carried out autonomously.34 This capability could be enhanced
through multivehicle control where a single individual tasks a group of vehicles
that coordinates amongst themselves accomplish the task as a swarm.35 For
instance, an individual could task a swarm of missiles with a set of targets, but
allow the missiles to coordinate among themselves to choose the target to
strike.36 Scharre observes that when the number of elements in a swarm in-
creases, human control must shift increasingly to the swarm as a whole, rather
than micromanaging individual elements, clearly implying that swarms are fully
capable of operating autonomously to handle complex tasks.37
The ‘Dekker Architecture’ suggests several models including centralised
NCW, hub request, hub swarm, joint, request based, mixed and swarming
which, will be discussed shortly.38 Even if at present it is the case of acting
collectively, future technology would invariably lead towards greater independ-
ence from individual swarm members. Dekker, using the principles of swarming,
developed a swarm architecture39 broadly defined under four heads, based on a
command and control structure (C2) for use in a NCW. It should be noted here
that modern warfare is moving away from the platform-centric40 approach of the
last century towards a more network-centric approach with embedded nodal
command and control structure.41 Dekker’s architecture broadly presents
34 Scharre (n 6). The author also notes that in near term, this will entail a shift to
mission-level-autonomy and multi-vehicle control, which would in turn require new
command-and-control models to allow humans to employ large swarms effectively.
35 ibid.
36 ibid. The author notes that it is likely that a human could task a group of vehicles to
maintain coverage over an area, for surveillance, communications relay, electronic
warfare or to establish a defensive perimeter, and the vehicles might coordinate to
determine how best to cover the area. The author also adds that the vehicles could
exist across multiple domains, such as air, sea surface and undersea vehicles operating
collectively with one person controlling the group
37 ibid. The author points out that this area on exercising effective command-and-control
over a swarm is still a nascent research.
38 A Dekker, ‘A Taxonomy of Network Centric Warfare Architectures’ Defence
Science and Technology Organisation, Canberra (Australia 2008). The Dekker archi-
tecture was developed to provide a taxonomy of possible NCW architecture, in order
to illuminate the possible options for the Australian Defence Force.
39 ibid.
40 Viewed as the classic American way of war, platform centric warfare has historically
been the way warfare was conducted since WWII by the USA. See AL Bailey, ‘The
Implications of Network Centric Warfare’ (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA
2004).
41 See AK Cebrowski, and JJ Garstka, ‘Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future’
(1998) 124(1) US Naval Institute Proceedings. The author notes that NCW derives its
power from the strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed
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three NCW options, viz, a centralised model, a request-based model, and a
swarming model. The centralised model has a single high-value central hub
node, surrounded by a cluster of nodes of lower value—in the absence of the
high-value hub the cluster of nodes of lower value may not be able to operate.42
Under the request-based model presents the combination of fully value-sym-
metric and heterogeneous forces—a collection of pure specialists, all different,
but all of equal value. Here, each node does only a few tasks, and does them
extremely well—the result is a request-based architecture. The third model pre-
sented by Dekker is swarming, which is the combination of fully value-symmet-
ric and homogenous forces of identical nodes. In this model, the nodes must
share their sensor information, and self-synchronise so as to mass the effect of
their weapons. Dekker further subdivides the swarming model as emergent
swarming and situationally aware swarming.43 By way of summary, it is import-
ant to note that Dekker’s model/architecture does not explicitly refer to drone
swarms. However, Dekker’s model has then been adopted by other commenta-
tors such as Scharre and Burdick who then explicitly apply this to drone
swarms.44
As Scharre notes, in more recent times concept for cooperative multi-vehicle
control have been demonstrated in simulations and some real-world experi-
ments,45 and the operation of a drone swarm is technically feasible today.46
Discussing the C2 models Scharre opines that to exercise effective command-
and-control over a swarm is an area of nascent research, suggesting a possible C2
model ordered from more centralized to increasingly decentralized control.47
Scharre’s model encompasses four distinctively different NCWs, viz,
force. See also BC Logan, ‘Technical Reference Model for Network-Centric
Operations’ (2003) 16(8) Crosstalk 22–25. The author notes that ‘. . . NCW is an in-
formation superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat
power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared aware-
ness . . . .’ See generally, DS Alberts, JJ Garstka and FP Stein, Network Centric
Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority Assistant Secretary of
Defense (C3I/Command Control Research Program, Washington DC 2000).
42 Dekker compares the ‘hub’ to what Clausewitz called the ‘centre of gravity . . .. on
which everything depends’.
43 Dekker (n 38).
44 Burdick (n 2). The author uses the expression ‘remotely piloted aircrafts’ as opposed
to drones.
45 Scharre (n 6).
46 It was reported in the early part of 2016 that the US Navy was preparing to fly a drone
swarm through its Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology
Program (LOCUST). See, D Hambling, ‘US Navy Plans to Fly First Drone Swarm
This Summer’ Defense Tech (4 January 2016)5https://www.defensetech.org/2016/01/
04/u-s-navy-plans-to-fly-first-drone-swarm-this-summer/4 (15 March 2017).
47 Scharre (n 6). Scharre also takes the view that when the number of elements in a
swarm increases, human control must shift increasingly to the swarm as a whole,
rather than micromanaging individual elements.
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i) Centralized control model: the swarm elements feed information back to
a central planner which then tasks each element individually.
ii) Hierarchical control model: the individual swarm elements are con-
trolled by “squad” level agents, which are in turn controlled by higher-
level controllers, and so on.
iii) Coordination by consensus model: the swarm elements communicate
to one another and converge on a solution through voting or auction-based
methods.
iv) Emergent coordination model: the coordination arises naturally by
individual swarm elements reacting to others, like in animal swarms.48
Complex swarm algorithms can be used for flight dynamics of individual as well
as neighbouring aircraft, and essentially making the decisions for the swarm.49 In
2014, a team of researchers led by Vijay Kumar from the University of
Pennsylvania demonstrated their swarm-enabling algorithms.50 Paul Burdick,
in a study of the logistics requirements of remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs),
suggests that for a given situation, a fully autonomous RPA will fly according to
the rule structures and algorithms (or parameters) programmed into its
software.51
Importantly, Burdick notes that going by the Unmanned Systems Integrated
Roadmap, human-supervised autonomous systems may be possible as early as
2018, and swarms of fully autonomous systems may pass research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) stages between 2020 and 2036.52 Burdick also
presents the argument that swarms may potentially have the ability to collect-
ively change their radar signatures to mimic larger manned aircraft.53 This could
be possible as individual swarming aircraft/drones are small, and be able to fly in
tight formations such that their radar signature appears similar to larger civilian
or military aircraft.54 Burdick also postulates the argument, that an RPA
48 ibid.
49 M Turpin, N Michael and V Kumar, ‘Trajectory Design and Control for Aggressive
Formation Flight with Quadrotors’ (2012) 33(1–2) Autonomous Robots 143–56.
50 See V Kumar, ‘Vijay Kumar: Robots That Fly . . . and Cooperate’, TED.com
(February 2012) 5https://www.ted.com/talks/vijay_kumar_robots_that_fly_and_co-
operate4 (accessed 21 March 2017). The algorithms enabled formations of quad-
rotor helicopters to accomplish multiple cooperative tasks, including advanced for-
mation flight manoeuvres. German scientists A Bu¨rkle, F Segor and M Kollman
created sets of computer rules for collaborative micro RPA swarms, ground-based
sensors, vehicles and ground control stations. See A Bu¨rkle, F Segor and M Kollmann,
‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV Swarms’, (2011) 61(1–4) Journal of Intelligent and
Robotic Systems 339–53.
51 Burdick (n 2). The author uses the expression ‘remotely piloted aircrafts’ as opposed
to drones.
52 DoD, US ‘Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036’, (2013) 89
5https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap2011.pdf4 (accessed 23 October 2017).
53 Burdick (n 2).
54 ibid. Burdick also notes that the ability to change the shape of the swarm may also
provide the ability to change radar signatures as desired by mission constraints.
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swarm’s kinetic payloads may provide sufficient force at much less cost than
traditional aircraft.55
In summary, swarming is being extended to all domains of warfare, including
to form a ‘swarm of drones’. Here, each drone operating as a node is assigned
with specific tasks, and drones in turn come together to act as a swarm through
the use of rule structure, or algorithms.56 The creation of drone swarms and their
capabilities to be used in an NCW has now been established—both through
theoretical expositions and field experiments. By way of conclusion therefore,
Section A has underscored that a swarm can be seen as both individual and
collective, but this very much depends on the model used to programme it. Thus,
it is too simplistic to say that that swarm is either the sum of its parts or the
whole.
B. The Human Presence
Is the swarm’s behavioural pattern simply analogous to that of a fighter squad-
ron’s tactical formation and is there something inherently unique about the way
in which it operates? This question, again, depends entirely on the rule structure/
algorithm (the NCW/C2/CI4 model) that is programmed into the drone swarms
which, is also subjectively dependant on the terrain and the task that has been
assigned to the drone swarms. While it is impossible to avoid drawing parallels
with a swarm’s formation and that of any other battlefield formation (fighter
squadron, fleet etc), the assertion repeated and maintained in Section B, is that
the swarm is inherently unique but with the caveat this is contingent on the rule
structure applied. To facilitate this discussion, it is necessary to briefly refer back
to Scharre’s model in Section A. As noted above, Scharre sets out four key
models (all of which, are applicable to swarms):
(i) Centralized control model: the swarm elements feed information back
to a central planner which then tasks each element individually.
(ii) Hierarchical control model: the individual swarm elements are con-
trolled by “squad” level agents, which are in turn controlled by higher-level
controllers, and so on.
55 ibid. The destructive power of lightweight bombs carried by swarming RPAs will
likely increase over a period of time to deliver destructive power equivalent to the
bombs loaded on today’s manned combat aircraft, as ongoing research has already
increased the destructive force of some explosives without increasing their weight or
volume. See, J Gartner, ‘Military Reloads with Nanotech’ MIT Technology Review
(21 January 2005) 5https://www.technologyreview.com/s/403624/military-reloads-
with-nanotech/4 (accessed 22 March 2017).
56 Algorithms that are programmed into individual nodes/drones can be seen as pre-
made decisions, which process will repeat itself as long as the node is in operation,
which is subject to its guidance system. See also Burdick (n 2).
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(iii) Coordination by consensus model: the swarm elements communicate
to one another and converge on a solution through voting or auction-based
methods.
(iv) Emergent coordination model: the coordination arises naturally by
individual swarm elements reacting to others, like in animal swarms.
The question posed here is ultimately, where (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) can be analo-
gised to that of a fighter jet squadron. The premise maintained and presented is
that a drone swarm is unique. The centralised control model (i) very much
replicates that of a fighter jet squadron—while the pilots may communicate
with one another, their overall mission statement is coordinated centrally by
ground control. Therefore, the degree of autonomy to individual pilots is lim-
ited. Under the hierarchical control model, (ii) one could equally conclude that
this also replicates the model used by a fighter squadron—there is a higher
authority giving overall direction but the squadron leader maintains a degree
of autonomy. The co-ordination by consensus model, (iii) is where one starts to
notice an appreciable difference. Here, the drones would have the autonomy to
take an autonomous decision between and amongst themselves, whereas the
squadron (while the pilots may of course, communicate individually between
each other) would still be ultimately in the hands of ground control in terms of
target package etc. And finally, the emergent co-ordination model (iv) is inher-
ently unique in terms of intuitive, since there is no need for communication with
ground control. This is probably the clearest category to suggest that the drone
swarm (under this architecture) is far more complex than that of a fighter squad-
ron. Yes, one could posit that fighter pilots of a high degree of training may act
in a similar way, but the level of intuition as to how the group operates falls far
short as to that of a drone under this type of programming. Even if this view is
rejected, the authors’ maintain that it is simply a matter of time before it be-
comes so. Applying this back to the premise of B, depending which model is
being used will, one could say that model (i) is indeed the equivalent of a fighter
jet formation. However, if (ii), (iii) and (iv) are used then this suggests that the
Swarm is indeed inherently unique.
C. Chain of Command
This section will primarily inform the discussion in Sections 3 and 4 of this article
by considering the exact chain of command (C2) that the algorithms provide.
Intrinsically linked to discussions concerning the uniqueness of a swarm pre-
sented in Section B is to understand the chain of command structure by which
the swarm operates. The implications for the chain of command structure in-
variably surface when deconstructing the swarms’ ability (or not) to comply with
distinction, proportionality and the duty to take precautions (‘The General
Principles’ of IHL) in Section 4. As noted in the abstract, would, for example,
the chain of command structure in a drone swarm encompass the concept of the
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‘reasonable military commander’ when it comes to targeting?57 As with Sections
A and B, the analysis will be grounded within the four models presented by
Burdick and Scharre.
Recalling:
i) Centralized control model: the swarm elements feed information back to
a central planner which then tasks each element individually.
ii) Hierarchical control model: the individual swarm elements are con-
trolled by “squad” level agents, which are in turn controlled by higher-
level controllers, and so on.
iii) Coordination by consensus model: the swarm elements communicate
to one another and converge on a solution through voting or auction-based
methods.
iv) Emergent coordination model: the coordination arises naturally by
individual swarm elements reacting to others, like in animal swarms.
Under the centralized control model, (i) the chain of command is relatively
straightforward and indeed comparable to that of a simple military command
structure. According to Scharre and Brudick’s centralized control model,58 there
would be effectively a ‘lead’ drone within the swarm dictating operations.59
Within centralized control model, all nodes are identical.60 As Lenahan notes,
‘the choice of “leader” is therefore made on the basis of suitable position, cur-
rent combat situation, or other transient factors’—an approach similar to that of
special force teams whereby individuals can take operational command.61
Lenahan further elaborates that in the event, the leader is unable to continue
for any reason, the nodes agree on a replacement who, continues with the
mission.62
The hierarchical control model (ii) meanwhile operates with a nodal system.63
Each node in turn controls multiple subsets within the swarm that in turn could
also be nodes.64 Hierarchical Swarming as Dekker observes, replicates the more
traditional military structure command and control C2 architecture.65 Should
one of the nodes become neutralized, the hierarchy is preserved via the promo-
tion of other nodes—ensuring, that the commanding node retains the situational
awareness it requires.66 In terms of chain of command, ‘the commanding node
57 See RD Sloane, ‘Puzzles of Proportion and the “Reasonable Military Commander”:
Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality’, (2015) 6 Harvard
National Security Journal 299–343. Also see the discussion in Section 4 of this article.
58 Scharre (n 6); Brudick (n 2).
59 ibid.
60 Dekker (n 38); Lenahan and others (n 31).
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
64 ibid.
65 ibid.
66 Dekker (n 38).
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then produces a “big picture” plan (often called “intent”), this is passed down
the hierarchy, and tactical detail is added by subordinate nodes’.67 This means
that at the start of each operation, the lead drone determines the battle plan and
search pattern, including the number of servant drones required, and crucially,
tasking each drone with their own specific operational remit.68
The co-ordination by consensus model (iii) [referred to some as distributed
swarming] enables the swarm to operate without a discernible fixed chain of
command—individual members within the swarm would vote as to their choice
of action. In the more traditional sense, one could analogise that the command-
ing officer of a Special Forces operation has been neutralised and the remaining
members of the squadron vote as to whether they proceed with the original
mission brief. The chain of command model, therefore, is such that all decisions
are achieved through consensus. Lenahan cautions that this model is confined to
what he deems as simple ‘problems’.69 In other words, there would need to be a
unitary decision and each node would have the same plan.70 Furthermore, such a
chain of command would require each node to have exactly the same situational
awareness parameters—an issue which, as Lenahan notes, does not apply to
most military operations.71
The fourth and final model, the emergent co-ordination model (iv) is more
conceptually challenging. As with the coordination by consensus model, there is
no visible chain of command. The Swarm acts ‘organically’ based on the emer-
ging situation, shaped by external elements rather than a pre-determined course
of action. One might suggest (this will be discussed further in Section 4) that this
is a double-edged sword when it comes to IHL compliance.72 On the one hand,
one could controversially suggest that such intuitive action may enable the
swarm to cease an attack within nanoseconds if, for example, the swarm ascer-
tains that its original target, a building for example, no longer contains military
personnel but is full of civilians.73 However, on the minus side, intuitive action
could result in a metaphorical ‘rush of blood’—the swarm’s intuition overrides
its ability to make a more ‘detached’ assessment of its IHL obligations.74
Clearly, one could be highly critical and reject the use of human metaphors
(such as ‘rush of blood’) as they are inappropriate to describe actions under-
taken by non-sentient beings. However, the authors maintain that while this may
be the case, such language does ‘capture’ the idea of intuition.
67 ibid; Lenahan and others (n 31).
68 Lenahan and others (n 31).
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 See discussion in Section 4(B).
73 ibid.
74 ibid.
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3. Legal Framework from a Jus ad Bellum Perspective
A. Jus ad Bellum Framework
This section necessitates a brief overview of the jus ad bellum framework in
order to ascertain the extent to which a defensive response by a swarm is fully
jus ad bellum compliant. Article 2(4), or more precisely, the prohibition con-
tained therein is absolute in terms of interdicting both threats and actual uses of
force.75 The views on the peremptory nature of the prohibition is varied—ran-
ging from voicing caution against an overly liberal use of the peremptory
status,76 to arguing that the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) has peremptory
status, and accordingly, cannot be derogated from.77 For clarity and to avoid
misinterpretation, it is important to stress that it is not Article 2(4) per se that
has peremptory status, but rather, it is the prohibition of the use of force con-
tained therein.78 The UN Charter contains both a ‘negative’ prohibition,
enshrined in Article 2(4) and a ‘positive’ duty, contained in Article 2(3),
which requires Member States to settle their disputes resorting to peaceful
methods. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter categorically states that the UN does
not have the authority to intervene in a state’s domestic affairs. The combined
legal effect of Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 2(7) alongside the customary principle of
non-intervention, provides a general obligation against states’ interferingence in
the sovereign affairs of other states.79 The two permissible exceptions to the
prohibition contained in Article 2(4) are self-defence and collective security.
Since the remit of this article is centred on automated self-defence in the oper-
ation of drone swarms, the discussion will not venture into an examination of
collective security. A further caveat is to note that a state’s inherent right to
75 This is area of the jus ad bellum, remains consistently subjected to careful scholarly
attention. Francis Grimal and Jae Sundaram, Cyberwarfare and Autonomous Self-
Defence, 4(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (2017), 322 who
note the following scholarly literature: O Corten, The Law Against War: The
Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart 2010) 50–
197; TM Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks
(CUP 2002) 11–19; and N Schrijver, ‘The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter’
in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law
(OUP 2015) 466.
76 JA Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’
(2010) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 215.
77 A Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006).
78 Green (n 76).
79 Noting, that Treaties are interpreted according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT). See also GI Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Wildy,
Simmonds and Hill 2003) 141. See also the UN General Assembly Resolutions, The
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/
RES/2625 (XXV) 24 October 1970) and The Declaration on the Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in
International Relations. (A/RES/42/22 November 1987).
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invoke self-defence under customary international law is well documented, and
therefore, this article will avoid opening ‘old wounds’.
A state’s inherent right of self-defence is contained both in pre-existing
Charter law, in the form of customary international law, and Article 51 of the
UN Charter.80 In order for a state to invoke the right of self-defence, Article 51
requires that the state must have suffered an ‘armed attack,’ or at the very least
be faced with a sufficiently serious and imminent threat of suffering an armed
attack.81 Unfortunately (and frustratingly), Article 51 remains silent as to what
constitutes an ‘armed attack’, and the applicable threshold. The ICJ’s judgment
in the Nicaragua case82 and scholarly commentary conclude that the threshold of
an armed attack should be defined in the following terms: ‘the most grave form
of the use of force’—a qualitatively grave use of force—beyond a use of force
simpliciter.83 Ruys helpfully identifies that the ICJ’s pronouncement in
Nicaragua (in terms of requiring a certain ‘scale and effect’—beyond a use of
force simpliciter) has caused divisions within the literature whereby some
bemoan the exclusion of ‘mere frontier incidents’ as satisfying the requisite
threshold of Article 51.84
Having suffered an armed attack, the lawfulness of a state’s response, is
calibrated by the cardinal parameters of necessity and proportionality. Both
necessity and proportionality are deep-rooted in customary international law,
and were articulated in the correspondence between the then US Secretary of
State Daniel Webster, and the British representative to the US, Lord
Ashburton, with regards to and forming part of the Caroline incident dating
back to 1837.85 According to Daniel Webster, in order for a state to lawfully
invoke self-defence it would need to:
80 See Grimal and Sundaram (n 75), at 327, who note: JA Green and F Grimal, ‘The
Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense Under International Law’ (2011) 44
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 285–329, 299.
81 DW Greig, ‘Self Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?’
(1991) 40(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 366–402.nota bene: art 51
of the UN Charter remains silent as to imminence. For the more liberal view as to the
possibility of self-defence against a sufficiently serious and imminent threat of suffer-
ing an armed attack, see Grimal and Sundaram (n 75), at 327, who note Terry D Gill,
‘The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua Case’ (1989) 1 Hague
Yearbook of International Law 30, 35.
82 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United
States of America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
83 Green and Grimal (n 80) 300; A Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence under
Customary International Law and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Bruylant 2000) 57.
84 T Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary
Law and Practice (Cambridge 2010) 140.
85 Letter dated 27 July 1842, from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (1841–42) XXX
British and Foreign State Papers 193–4, extract taken from Webster’s earlier letter to
Henry S Fox dated 24 April 1841 (1840–1) XXIX British and Foreign State Papers
1137, 1137–8 (Caroline formula).
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[S]how a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that . . . [it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it.
The entwined principles of necessity and proportionality are derived from the
Webster formulation.86 De nos jours, necessity questions whether it was reason-
able to use force as a last resort, and, if non-forcible measures were a reasonable
alternative in the circumstances, that the state explored and exhausted those
‘options’. It is also possible to pose the questions to establish a state’s actions
satisfy the requirement of necessity, as follows: (i) the state has exhausted all
non-forcible measures87 and (ii) it would be wholly unreasonable to expect the
responding state to attempt a non-forcible response,88 meaning that a ‘forceful
response’ is a measure of last resort. Proportionality, meanwhile stipulates that
the ‘force employed must not be excessive with regard to the goal of abating or
repelling the attack’.89 Some commentators hold the view that a state’s response
need not actually mirror the initial attack, numerically speaking. For instance, if
State A fires a dozen missiles at State B, then State B is not obligated under the
concept of proportionality to respond in kind.90
One needs to bear in mind the distinction between the lawfulness of a de-
fending state’s action taken during an on-going armed attack—referred to as the
86 See Green and Grimal (n 80) 299. See generally JA Green ‘Docking the Caroline:
Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary
International Law Concerning Self-Defence’ (2006) 14 Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law 429.
87 Regarding this point on necessity, See Grimal and Sundaram (n 75), 327 who note: JA
Green, ‘The Ratione Temporis Elements of Self-Defence’, (2015) 2(1) Journal on the
Use of Force in International Law 100–01; G Schwarzenberger, ‘The Fundamental
Principles of International Law’ (1955) 87 Recueil Des Cours 9, 97; Y Dinstein, War,
Aggression and Self-Defence (CUP 2011) 187, 232; Green (n 76) 450–57; Ruys (n 84)
95–98; See M Williamson, Terrorism, War and International Law: The Legality of the
Use of Force against Afghanistan in 2001 (Ashgate 2009) 115; J Gardham, Necessity,
Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States (CUP 2004) 6 and 11; and Green and
Grimal (n 80) 300–02. See also Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of
Iran v United States of America) (merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, paras 63, 76 and 120.
88 ibid. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms, ibid.
89 Grimal and Sundaram (n 75) 328 who cite the following: See Constantinou (n 83) 159–
61; GM Badr, ‘The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility’ (1980)
10 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; D Kretzmer, ‘Killing of
Suspected Terrorists: Extra Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’
(2005) 16(2) European Journal of International Law 171–212.
90 S Etezazian, ‘The Nature of the Self-Defence Proportionality Requirement’ (2016)
3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 260, 264–67; See Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, dis-
senting opinion of Judge Higgins, para 5. See also, generally, D Kretzmer, ‘The
Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum’ (2013) 24(1)
European Journal of International Law 235, 237; Green and Grimal (n 80) 301.
18 of 31 Francis Grimal and Jae Sundaram
‘cumulative effect’ by Garwood-Gowers,91 and instances where force continues
to be employed after the cessation of the armed attack. In Green’s view, in
instances during an on-going armed attack, there must be a reasonable temporal
proximity between the victim State’s response and the armed attack itself.92
Green adopts the position that the ‘reasonableness’ parameter is somewhat
vague, and is certainly open to interpretation along the lines of ‘a context-spe-
cific appraisal of the various factors that may delay a self-defence action: intel-
ligence gathering, initial resort to negotiation, geographical disparity, and so
on’.93 This section has briefly sought to provide the basic topography and con-
tours of the salient jus ad bellum considerations—in terms of the defensive
aspects, enabling the following section to engage in a theoretical deconstruction
of the jus ad bellum application. Typically, no discussion on self-defence is com-
plete without the inclusion of the concept of imminence. Since the analysis
presented in Section 3(B) is restricted to an actual ‘armed attack’ on the
Swarm as opposed to the Swarm taking either anticipatory or pre-emptive
action the article will not seek to reopen or apply this particular debate within
the literature.94
B. Jus ad Bellum Application
Rather than revisit the thoroughly comprehensive corpus of literature surround-
ing lawfulness of drone strikes from a jus ad bellum perspective95 the purpose of
91 As noted by Grimal and Sundaram (n 75) 328. See generally, A Garwood-Gowers,
‘Self-Defence Against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World’ (2004) 4 Queensland
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 1.
92 As noted by Grimal and Sundaram (n 75). See JA Green ‘The Ratione Temporis
Elements of Self-Defence’ (2015) 2(1) Journal on the Use of Force and
International Law 97–118.
93 ibid.
94 By way of overview, state practice evidences not only that the attack must be immi-
nent, but also reflects the ICJ’s pronouncement that there is a further consideration—
that the imminent attack must attain a certain threshold in terms of gravity (ie, there
needs to be an imminent ‘armed attack’). See NA Shah, ‘Self-Defence, Anticipatory
Self-Defence and Pre-Emption: International Law’s Response to Terrorism’ (2007)
12(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 95, 101–4, 111–19 (describing the gravity
and immediacy of the threat required to justify self-defence under international law).
95 On this point, see eg C Henderson, ‘Introducing Perspectives on the Joint
Committee’s Drones Report’, (2016) 3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and
International Law 194–97; C Gray, ‘Targeted Killing Outside Armed Conflict: A
New Departure for the UK’, (2016) 3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and
International Law 198–204; ME O’Connell, ‘The Law on the Lethal Force Begins
with the Right to Life’, (2016) 3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International
Law 204–09; ND White, ‘The Joint Committee, Drone Strikes and Self-Defence:
Caught in No Man’s Land?’ (2016) 3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and
International Law 210–16; K Bannelier-Christakis, ‘The Joint Committee’s, Drones
Report: Far-Reaching Conclusions on Self-Defence Based on a Dubious Reading
of Resolution 2249’ (2016) 3(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law
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this section is to pose and deconstruct one key, fundamental question. Does the
automated response by a swarm satisfy the necessity and proportionality re-
quirements needed for the lawful invocation of self-defence? The scenario envi-
saged here is assuming one member of the swarm is attacked/neutralised, how
would the response of the swarm itself need to manifest itself in order to comply
with a state’s inherent right of self-defence? In order to more forensically ad-
dress this broader, overarching question, the authors propose to use the four
models of network drone swarming set out in Section 2 as a framework for
analysis. Depending on the specific architecture of the swarm the lawfulness
of its actions may be affected.
Before delving into specifics, the following observations may be presented by
way of overview. If one single drone within the swarm is attacked, would that
satisfy the grave use of force threshold required by Article 51 to constitute an
‘armed attack’96 thus enabling the swarm to invoke an automated response in
self-defence? The first observation to underscore is that by ‘automated’, the
authors use this to describe an action whereby the weapons system itself re-
sponds automatically—the system assesses that it has been attacked albeit within
micro seconds and responds immediately to the attack. A response in self-de-
fence by its very nature is not inherently autonomous—a state or more specif-
ically a weapons system can choose not to ‘reply’ to the initial armed attack
unless programmed otherwise. One could similarly analogise as to whether a
state would view the downing of a sole military jet within a formation as con-
stituting an armed attack. However, providing the attack does meet the armed
attack threshold, clearly the response would have to comply with necessity and
proportionality. This invites the question as to the extent to which the UAVs
programmed to make the call that all non-forceful measure have been ex-
hausted, and whether it would be wholly unreasonable to expect a non-forceful
response—bearing in mind that the swarm would undertake such calculations.
Proportionality wise, the response would have to be in line with the defensive
necessity of abating or repelling a further attack.97 In this sense, if the swarm’s
response is simply to ‘take out’ the attacker, eg an anti-drone system (akin to a
Missile Defence Shield)98—one could argue that this response would probably
fall within the applicable framework and the action be rendered lawful.
217–26; S Breau, ‘Reflections on the Treatment of the Decision-Making Process in
Section 4 of the Joint Committee’s Drone Strikes Report’ (2016) 3(2) Journal on the
Use of Force and International Law 227–33. See also, A Chehtman, ‘The ad bellum
Challenge of Drones: Recalibrating Permissible Use of Force’, (2017) 28(1) European
Journal of International Law 173–97.
96 See Nicaragua case (n 82).
97 Etezazian (n 90); see Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) n 90. See also, generally,
Kretzmer (n 90); Green and Grimal (n 80) 301.
98 For further discussion on this, see eg F Grimal, ‘Missile Defence Shields: Automated
and Anticipatory Self-defence?’ (2014) 19(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law
317–39.
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In effect, there are two variables at play: the architecture itself (ie the model
used) and the algorithms used in the programming of individual drones. One
could say that depending on which model is used, the temporal considerations
are also altered; albeit within nanoseconds. The consensus model for example,
would require a longer timeframe for the swarm to vote on action as opposed to
a more immediate response. In terms of the temporal requirements of self-de-
fence, this poses no real problem—the response is still within a very constrained
timeframe—it is proximate, but there may be differing responses between the
different models in terms of reaction times. The authors propose that depending
on the model/architecture utilised may affect the degree of lawfulness in terms
of the extent to which the swarm can satisfy the necessity and proportionality
requirements but that this is underpinned by the extent of the programming
itself. Models (i), (ii) and (iii) are probably capable of complying with the
self-defence parameters whereas the unpredictability of model (iv) does invite
the question as to whether that swarm architecture is compliant.
(i) Centralized control model: the swarm elements feed information back
to a central planner which then tasks each element individually.
Under the centralized control model, one could posit that the mechanism for
assessing and calibrating the response in terms of necessity and proportionality
is greatly assisted by the fact the decision is taken back at ‘command and con-
trol’. While the swarm itself may not benefit strategically—it may take longer for
the swarm to be able to defend itself in terms of taking self-defence action but
from a legal perspective, it is easier to prove that the swarm is satisfying the
necessity element of the concept of last resort.
ii) Hierarchical control model: the individual swarm elements are con-
trolled by “squad” level agents, which are in turn controlled by higher-
level controllers, and so on.
Similar to the centralized control model, one could submit that the same con-
clusions are equally applicable within this architectural set-up. The idea of a
hierarchical decision suggests that there is again, greater scope for ensuing com-
pliance albeit theoretically. The swarm is subject to an oversight process in terms
of whether a decision for it to respond is taken. However, one could of course,
quickly counter that this again depends entirely on the programming—a ‘poorly’
programmed higher level control may not necessarily reach the correct ‘legal’
decision.
iii) Coordination by consensus model: the swarm elements communicate
to one another and converge on a solution through voting or auction-based
methods.
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Depending on the model, could affect the way in which the ‘decision’ to respond
is taken. Under the consensus model, all members within the swarm would
presumably have to vote as a unit as to whether they collectively view that
the necessity element has been satisfied, and whether the proposed course of
action would be proportionate to the defensive necessity of abating or repelling
an attack.
iv) Emergent coordination model: the coordination arises naturally by
individual swarm elements reacting to others, like in animal swarms.
This is possibly the most problematic model in terms of compliance. Given the
reaction is ‘intuitive’/organic, this begs the question as to whether that architec-
ture would compute the legal requirements in the same way—subject of course
to programming. Perhaps, here, there is too great a degree of autonomy to the
swarm as to whether it may comply with necessity and proportionality. A further
‘footnote’ to this section is to underscore whether the rules of engagement
would change in terms of a swarm shooting down a single drone incursion
into its territory. Would the swarm escort the single drone out of its airspace?
4. IHL Compliance?
A. Jus in Bello Considerations
For the purposes of this article, and given the nature of the enquiry into swarm
behaviour (the swarm as a method of warfare), analysis of jus in bello consid-
erations will be limited to that of targeting, since that is the primary area of
interest in terms of calibrating ‘swarm compliance’.99 At this juncture, it is per-
haps necessary to provide a brief overview regarding the overall applicable
framework and the context within which IHL operates. As a basic precept of
IHL, the starting point is to underscore that IHL will only be applicable if the
Swarm is acting in the context of an armed conflict.100 If such action falls outside
the context of an international armed conflict (IAC) or indeed a non-interna-
tional armed conflict (NIAC),101 then the applicable law is the less lenient and
99 For a very useful overview regarding regulation of combat drones, see C Heyns and
others, ‘The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones’
(2016) 64(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 791–827.
100 Generally, art 2 of the Geneva Conventions where their scope of application is
defined, one could also include the definition for IACs given in art 2(2) and for
NIACs in Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction
in Prosecutor v Tadic, 1995, para 70. See generally R Kolb, Advanced Introduction to
International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014).
101 nota bene: it is important to state that this is not the only scenario outside of an
international armed conflict. For example, what if such actions take place during
peacetime? Would it be possibly for the swarm to use force without technically trig-
gering International Humanitarian Law? The authors concede that while this
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more restrictive (when it comes to having recourse to lethal force) corpus found
within international human rights law.102 Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, lethal force is only permissible in three specific instances: first, if
it is absolutely necessary to prevent or protect loss of human life in the face of an
unlawful use of force.103 Secondly, lethal force may be permissible if it is used to
execute an arrest.104 And thirdly, lethal force may be authorised if it is to quell a
riot or insurrection.105 As Roscini notes, the transition from European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provisions in peace time to IHL in
the context of an armed conflict tracks a shift in perspective—lethal force is
no longer protective but is now justified on the grounds of achieving a military
advantage.106
Having briefly noted the applicable framework, the attention will now turn
to briefly unpicking the parameters surrounding targeting. Targeting, simply
possibility is theoretically conceivable, the likelihood of swarm deployment during
peacetime is more remote. As Lubell notes, following Tadic, ‘under customary inter-
national law the IHL rules on international and non-international armed conflicts are
in essence much the same and according to the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) study the majority of IHL rules (though not all) apply to both types of
conflict’. N Lubell, ‘Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict’
(2005) 187(860) IRRC 747.
102 See ICRC Report, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ Power of Humanity, 32nd International Conference
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (8–10 July 2015)5https://www.icrc.org/en/docu-
ment/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts4
(accessed 9 August 2016). See 34, where the important differences between the con-
duct of hostilities and law-enforcement paradigms are highlighted. Principles of ne-
cessity, proportionality and precautions exist in both, but have distinct meanings and
operate differently. While the conduct of hostilities paradigm allows lethal force to be
directed against lawful targets as a first resort, the use of lethal force in law-enforce-
ment operations may be employed only as a last resort, subject to strict or absolute
necessity. This is the view seemingly posited by M Roscini. Roscini believes that a
fully autonomous UAS/UCAS could meet the principles of distinctio, particularly in
areas with little, or no civilians. See M Roscini, see Professor C Coke and Dr M
Roscini, ‘Transcript – Drones: The Future of War?’ (Chatham House, 8 April 2013)
, p. 10. 5https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Meetings/
Meeting%20Transcripts/080413Drones.pdf4 (31 May 2017). However, one could
also suggest that if it happens in the context of a NIAC then the applicable law is
the IHL on NIACs (alongside International Human Rights Law (IHRL)).
103 ibid. Given that Roscini enshrines his arguments within the context of the ECHR, the
authors of this article have proceeded on similar grounds. However, it should be noted
for completeness, that the ICCPR would be equally if not more so applicable than a
more regional treaty such as the ECHR.
104 ibid.
105 ibid.
106 This implicitly recognizes the lex specialis maxim. See Nuclear Weapons (advisory
opinion) (n 90) para 25; M Sasso`li and LM Olson, ‘The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible
Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, (2008) 90
(871) International Review of the Red Cross 599–627.
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put, is what is lawful and what is not in the context of an attack.107 Like its
self-defence counterpart within the jus ad bellum, two key parameters
operate within the jus in bello in order to ensure that action is IHL compli-
ant: distinction and proportionality.108 The first is distinction, which, categor-
ically and emphatically prohibits the direct attack on both civilians and
civilian objects.109 To do so constitutes a war crime.110 The second is
proportionality.
While proportionality is codified within Protocol to Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (API) 51(5)(b) the
actual terminology passes without direct mention within the actual text.111 In
a similar vein to its direct jus ad bellum namesake, it is fully enshrined both
within customary international law and treaty law.112 Proportionality balances
two critical elements/values: damage (incidental) and military advantage
107 Roscini (n 99). G Corn, JA Schoettler Jr, ‘Targeting and Civilian Risk Mitigation: The
Essential Role of Precautionary Measures’, (2015) 223(4) Military Law Review 785,
787; MN Schmitt and EW Widmar, ‘“On Target”: Precision and Balance in the
Contemporary Law of Targeting’, (2014) 7 Journal of National Security Law and
Policy 379.
108 Noting, of course, that these operate alongside a general duty and obligation to take
precautions to prevent incidental loss of life. See Y Dinstein, The Conduct of
Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (CUP 2010).
109 ibid. See ICRC Customary base referring to the first rule. J-M Henckaerts and L
Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1 (CUP 2009)
3–8. See also art 48 AP I and Additional Protocol I, arts 51(2), 52(1); Additional
Protocol II, art 13(2) (The civilian population); CHIL, Rules 1 and 7 Additional
Protocol I, art 51(4); CIHL, (ICRC) Rule 11. Additional Protocol I, art 51(5)(b);
CIHL, (ICRC) Rule 14. Additional Protocol I, art 57; CIHL, (ICRC) Rule 15–24.
110 K Do¨rmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, (CUP 2003) 130 and 233. See the
Judgment in The Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic – Case No IT-98-29-T (5 December
2010) Trial Chamber I5http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/
supp46-e/galic.htm4 (11 October 2016). However, not all attacks on civilians neces-
sarily a war crime. See Second Provision Rome Statute noting the word ‘intention-
ally’—there must be intention present:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
111 C Pilloud and others, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 625–26,
where it is stated that this provision ‘should therefore lead those responsible for such
attacks to take all necessary precautions before making their decision, even in the
difficult constraints of battle conditions’.
112 Proportionality is also fully operable in the context of a NIAC. See ICRC Customary
Rule 14. See J-M Henckaerts and others, ‘Customary International Humanitarian
Law: Other Persons Afforded Specific Protection’ (Rules 134–38) 46–50.
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whereby one must not be excessive to the other.113 If the incidental loss of life is
excessive to the supposed military gain, it could be considered as an indiscrim-
inate attack.114 This (incidental damage) becomes particularly apparent when a
target has dual use such as a power station.115 Military advantage must be con-
crete and direct following the requirements set out in Article 57(2)(a)(ii) found
within API. Schmitt and Thurner in their seminal work, explore whether au-
tonomous weapon systems are capable of performing proportionality calcula-
tions noting, that such calculations would require consideration by the AWS of
expected collateral damage and anticipated military advantage.116 As Schmitt
and Thurner acknowledge, this is a certainly a theoretical possibility, were the
swarm ‘be pre-programmed with unacceptable collateral damage thresholds for
particular target sets or situations’ along the lines of collateral damage
methodology.117
More problematic however, is actually when and how proportionality applies
as highlighted in the Final Report of the ICTY Committee on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) bombings.118 Broadly speaking, there must be an
attack as required by Article 49 API within which, there is an act of violence,
non-violent military harm is not enough resulting in loss of life to persons or
property—there is some sort of kinetic or physical damage.119 Alongside dis-
tinction and proportionality operates the third element: (forming the ‘Principles’
of IHL) the duty to take precautions when conducting an attack.120 The other
113 Rule 14 explicitly states that, ‘Launching an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited’. While ICRC customary rules
provide an invaluable interpretative source of customary IHL, they are of course
non-binding: International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International
Humanitarian Law Vol 1: Rules, (CUP 2009) - (hereinafter ICRC Rules).
114 art 51(5)(b): Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate: (a). . . (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
115 M Sasso`li, ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian Law’
(2003) 7 HPCR Policy Brief.
116 See M Schimitt and J Thurner ‘“Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and
the Law of Armed Conflict’, (2013) 4 Harvard National Security Journal 231–81.
Schimitt and Thurner note that ‘(CDEM) is a procedure whereby an attacking
force considers such factors as the precision of a weapon, its blast effect, attack tactics,
the probability of civilian presence in structures near the target, and the composition
of structures to estimate the number of civilian casualties likely to be caused during an
attack’.
117 ibid. The authors although do not refer to a ‘drone swarm’ but to an autonomous
weapons system.
118 Roscini (n 102).
119 ibid.
120 JJ-F Que´guiner, ‘Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities’
(2006) 88(864) International Review of the Red Cross 793–821.
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element to note, is the requirement under Article 49 API in terms of an ‘at-
tack’—this can either be offensive or defensive, and it is generally uncontrover-
sial that non-violent military harm is not enough to turn an act of hostility into
an attack for the purposes of A49 API.121
Finally, and perhaps most interesting of all is the concept of the ‘reasonable
military commander’.122 Conceived ostensibly, by the ICTY Committee on the
NATO bombings, the idea of the reasonable military commander attempts to
find a juste milieu between the more hawkish nature of IHL and the pacific
aspect of IHRL from the perspective of command responsibility.123 The creation
of the reasonable military commander attempts to guide the precarious balan-
cing act between anticipating the military advantage against the expected inci-
dental damage.124 Even if undertaken due diligently, one might say that this
perhaps somewhat uncharitably involves an element of subjective/‘guess
work’—the reasonable military commander, therefore, seeks to provide a
more objective approach.125 Clearly, if the calculated effects of the attack are
entirely unclear and unforeseeable the attack is like to be indiscriminate and,
therefore, prohibited under IHL.126
B. Jus in Bello Application
Given the breadth and depth of existing analysis surrounding a sole combat
drone’s compliance or, indeed, possible non-compliance with IHL, the article
will not seek to reopen pre-existing debate.127 Rather, the discussion will be
specifically limited to how drones attacking as a swarm would fall within the
IHL framework. This present section will adopt the same four models con-
sidered in Section 3(B) and analyse whether the differing architectures, affects
the swarm’s potential to comply with the key principles of IHL alongside the
concept of the reasonable military commander. Clearly, the same caveats raised
in terms of jus ad bellum considerations are also applicable: much will depend on
the nature of the task, the architecture used and the way in which the algorithms
have been preset. This section will confine itself to swarm compliance of IHL
solely to the aspect of targeting.
121 M Roscini, Cyber Operations and Use of Force in International Law (Oxford 2014)
178.
122 Sloane (n 57); MN Schmitt, L Arimatsu and T McCormack (eds), Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law-2010 (Springer 2011) 193; Roscini (n 121) 228.
123 ibid.
124 ibid.
125 ibid.
126 ibid.
127 See Heyns and others (n 99) for a very comprehensive discussion on single combat
drone / UAV compliance with IHL.
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i) Centralized control model: the swarm elements feed information back to
a central planner which then tasks each element individually.
In terms of distinction, the centralized control model offers less variance than
the emergent co-ordination model, and one could therefore, conclude that there
would be greater oversight in terms of ensuring that the ‘targeteer’, in this case
the central planner, is IHL compliant. The swarm is relaying information back
centrally and so, in theory at least, the element of autonomous action is limited
to a certain degree. Proportionality wise, one could also suggest that providing
the central planner is indeed a ‘reasonable military commander’, the swarm’s
actions have a degree of oversight. Clearly, and as with all models, if one were to
say that the swarm is inherently incapable of satisfying any of the IHL param-
eters, the swarm’s actions would be in violation of IHL—something addressed
further in the conclusion to this section.
ii) Hierarchical control model: the individual swarm elements are con-
trolled by “squad” level agents, which are in turn controlled by higher-
level controllers, and so on.
While there is an overall hierarchical set-up, there is a greater degree of auton-
omy to the swarm itself—the swarm is controlled by squad-level agents. The
hierarchical control model presents a slightly more problematic picture. Could
the squad-level agents successfully balance the incidental damage on civilians
and civilian objects versus the concrete and direct military advantage? Would
the swarm ‘appreciate’ the complexities of targeting a dual use power station
where it would theoretically need to account not only for the loss of civilian
function but also the consequences—recalling of course, that the military ad-
vantage must be concrete and direct. Equally, and within the concept of con-
crete and direct military advantage, one can refer of course to the ICRC’s
definition that this encompasses the concept of ground gained and the weaken-
ing/annihilation of the enemy’s military force.128 In a similar vein to the thresh-
old of a cyberattack (in terms of a concrete and direct military advantage), one
could draw a similar conclusion to that of Roscini—if that calculation encom-
passes protection of the attacking forces then the incidental damage has to also
be proportionately higher. Here, and as with a cyberattack, one could view that
the lack of human involvement (the swarms are of course the elements at risk),
the incidental damage that the swarm may cause also has to be held to a much
higher account. As Roscini himself recognises in the context of a cyberattack,
this becomes a very subjective balancing act.
128 See Roscini (n 121) 224, who notes that there is limited state practice (Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and Israel to support the view that when calculating concrete
and direct military advantage, the protection of the attacking forces should also be a
consideration.
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In sum, the precautions adopted by a belligerent state under API are as fol-
lows: using a mode or method of attack to avoid and minimise the incidental loss
of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. One could suggest that the hier-
archical control model—due to the ‘agency’ of the squad-level operators have
potential difficulty here. Would the hierarchical model allow for ‘feasible pre-
cautions’129 (this includes the protection of the attacking forces who are under
no obligation to sacrifice themselves)—the swarm itself may wish to self-pre-
serve. And finally, the duty to take precautions means that the mode of warfare
utilised may well minimise the risk to the attacking forces (in which case the
swarm) even if this decreases them military advantage, providing of course that
this has no bearing on the expected incidental damage on civilians or civilian
objects. 130
iii) Coordination by consensus model: the swarm elements communicate
to one another and converge on a solution through voting or auction-based
methods.
Many of the same concerns raised with regards to the hierarchical model present
themselves to the co-ordination by consensus model so rather than revisit each
one individually, it perhaps makes more sense to raise points of departure. The
key concern with the co-ordination by consensus model magnifies the problems
in complying with all the key IHL aspects. Providing of course the swarm is
‘correctly’ programmed, this is not an issue but one could easily flag up an
instance whereby the swarm is voting as to whether it should attack, for ex-
ample, a dual use infrastructure. One could be equally measured and say that
this is not too dissimilar to a regular infantry unit deciding on whether they
launch an artillery attack. However, the overwhelming concern is that lack of
the presence of a ‘reasonable military commander’ to evaluate the proportion-
ality elements of the proposed attack.
iv) Emergent coordination model: the coordination arises naturally by
individual swarm elements reacting to others, like in animal swarms.
Finally, the emergent co-ordination model suggests an increasingly high level of
autonomy (perhaps complete autonomy effectively) to the swarm. The over-
riding concern here is that the Swarm is left to its own devices. In of itself
one could counter argue and say that providing the programming of all the
algorithms correctly equates for distinction, proportionality, duty to take pre-
cautions etc, the swarm may still be IHL compliant. However, the reality is that
such autonomy does, as with all autonomous systems raise the question as to
129 ibid. 219.
130 Roscini (n 121).
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whether the swarm could distinguish its targets correctly, balance the loss of
civilian life against the direct and concrete military advantage and take the
necessary precautions without entirely without the presence of a reasonable
military commander. Unless of course, the concept of the reasonable military
commander is built into the software. In summary, the overarching suggestion is
that the greater level of autonomy to the swarm under (ii) – (iv) may pose
problems in terms of IHL compliance. More generally, in terms of autonomous
weapon systems as a whole, and following the Roscini line of thinking (who
dismisses the notion that autonomous systems are incapable of ever being com-
patible with IHL), the authors of this article, take a similarly measured view.131
It is less about whether the swarm does or does not violate IHL and more about
how the operations fit within the existing framework. Clearly, if the swarm is
incapable of fulfilling the distinction requirement, its use is inherently
unlawful.132
A basic tenet of IHL is that the commander must operate in real time and call
off an attack should that purport to violate principles of proportionality (in the
IHL sense) and distinction.133 If the drone is acting as a swarm, to what extent
should direct human involvement/participation be present in order to provide
oversight in terms of distinction and proportionality compliance? Again, one
might draw analogous conclusions to that of more general fully autonomous
systems. 134 While there may be a sense of ‘losing humanity’ further to a view
taken by Human Rights Watch in respect of fully autonomous systems,135 the
same counter-critiques pronounced by Roscini with respect to more ‘general’
fully autonomous weapons are equally apt in this instance and will be transposed
accordingly to the present discussion.136
First, the swarm in general terms may be operating far away from civilians eg
on the high seas—a purpose for which, a recent test by the US Navy confirms
that the swarm is fully apt.137 Secondly, and it is here that the present authors
take a slight issue with Roscini’s conclusion regarding autonomous weapons, in
that they are inherently unlikely to be motivated by self-preservation or re-
venge.138 Certainly, while the swarm is not motivated by revenge, its raison
131 ibid.
132 ibid.
133 ibid.
134 ICRC Rep (n 102) 44–47.
135 Roscini (n 121).
136 M Sasso`li, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified’, (2014) 90 International
Law Studies, US Naval War College 308–40, 310. The author notes, ‘Only human
beings can be inhuman and only human beings can deliberately choose not to
comply with the rules they were instructed to follow. To me, it seems more reasonable
to expect (and to ensure) a person who devises and constructs an autonomous weapon
in a peaceful workplace to comply with IHL than a soldier on the battlefield or in a
hostile environment’.
137 Roscini (n 121); Atherton (n 5). See also Bishop (n 23).
138 ibid.
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d’etre is premised on the survival instinct of protecting fellow members within
that swarm which, while not revenge per se, is something tangibly similar. And at
this stage one could heed to Roscini’s caution that sympathy and remorse may
not come so easily to an autonomous system, or in our case, the swarm. Equally,
would the swarm be able to balance the proportionality values of loss of life and
military advantage? With respect to autonomous weapons, Roscini views this
discussion as a fluid consideration within which, the pre-programming could
account for all counter variables.139
However, and in terms of the distinction and proportionality parameters (ac-
cepting that the use of UAVs are IHL compliant) should the actions of the
swarm (from a purely theoretical perspective, taking into account artificial intel-
ligence (AI) advances) be held to a higher level of accountability? While the
swarm may very well be pre-programmed, in a similar way to a soldier embark-
ing on first deployment it is only through combat ‘experience’ that the swarm
would become battle hardened and more perceptible through its AI advance-
ment. To lower the legal threshold would be clearly undesirable and unpalat-
able, however, from a strictly theoretical perspective the logical inference is that
the more combat experience the swarm has accrued the more likely it is both
strategically and also legally compliant.
In sum, the compliance with IHL, or lack thereof, by a swarm (again in rela-
tion to Roscini’s conclusions vis-a`-vis general autonomous systems) is predicated
on the fundamental concept that the recourse to drone swarms are not inher-
ently unlawful (there is no sense that the swarms are equipped with indiscrim-
inate weapons). However, there is clearly a sense of duty on the swarm
operators or indeed programmers (in the event the swarm is fully autonomous)
to take precautions so that if the target package is not militarily viable, the
attack must be suspended if the swarm is in doubt of civilian presence, or
indeed cease completely if surrender ensures.140
5. Conclusion
The article as a whole has sought to explore and shed light on a relatively
neglected area within the literature by examining the extent to which, drone
swarms are capable of complying with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello par-
ameters. Within this broad overall remit, the article has focused its attention on
specific areas contained in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello in order to
draw out the areas of tension (in terms of non-compliance) caused by the
swarm’s inherently unique behaviour. Within the confines of the jus ad bellum
the article notes that should the swarm ‘decide’ to ‘neutralise’ the attacker of
one of its members, providing such action fulfils the necessity and proportion-
ality criterion, such action would be lawful. More problematic, however, and this
139 Sasso`li (n 136).
140 Roscini (n 121).
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is something which, will require further scholarly scrunity whether the Swarm
engages in some form of anticipatory or interceptive defensive action. This
action is not necessarily unlawful per se, however, it raises questions as to the
exact threshold required for defensive measures by the swarms in order for them
to fall within this somewhat elastic area of self-defence. Potentially, a neutra-
lised drone within a swarm could satisfy the requirement, and one would also
have to adopt a more permissive view of self-defence that a non-territorial
attack can of course generate the lawful invocation of Article 51.
Usage or recourse to drone swarms is not inherently unlawful from a strict
IHL perspective. However, the Swarm be it acting fully autonomously or semi-
autonomously must have full regard to ensuring that the manner in which it
engages the target and the selection of the target itself remains within the strict
parameters of IHL. Given the progress being made in drone and swarm tech-
nology, and the rapid strides taken in deploying such advances to the conflict
zone, one is made to believe that a scenario like the above is highly likely. As in
the case of a State, there is also a clear sense of duty cast on the swarm operators
or indeed programmers to take all necessary precautions to ensure that if and
when the target package is perceived as not being militarily viable, (eg civilian
presence of civilians) any intended attack be suspended. Simply put, the com-
pliance with IHL, or lack thereof, by a swarm141 is predicated on the fundamen-
tal concept that the recourse to drone swarms are not inherently unlawful, as
one cannot take the position that the swarms are invariably equipped with in-
discriminate weapons. Extending liability, interesting though it may be, beyond
the swarm operator, and indeed programmer, is problematic. One could
argue142 that other categories of persons may also be liable (eg, the inventor
or architect of the system and technicians who maintain them). Would, however,
there be any beneficial distinction between a technician of a swarm as opposed
to a technician of a non-autonomous/conventional tactical unit? Does the tech-
nician who does not correctly attach the missiles to a fighter jet, for example, or
incorrectly ‘services’ nuclear weapons, then incur liability for IHL breach as a
result of missile malfunction? If the weapon is inherently lawful, and is pro-
grammed as such, then failure to ‘service’ the weapon does not change its law-
fulness although admittedly, it may affect its ability to comply with IHL.
The authors contend, at least in the confines of this Article that such extension
of liability makes no difference, and is also undesirable (the liability should and
must remain with the operating state).
141 Roscini’s conclusions vis-a`-vis general autonomous systems. See Roscini n 121.
142 The authors are grateful to this helpful suggestion made by the anonymous reviewer.
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